A Guest Blog by Bruce Zagaris, Esq.

Today we are very pleased to welcome guest blogger Bruce Zagaris, who is a Partner at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe.  He is the editor of the International Enforcement Law Reporter; the author of International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials; and an Adjunct Professor at the Texas A & M University School of  Law.  Mr. Zagaris also is a member of the Task Force on the Gatekeeper and the Profession of the American Bar Association (“ABA”).

As Mr. Zagaris explains immediately below, growing international trends have led the ABA Task Force to consider a new Model Rule of Professional Conduct that would impose basic “client due diligence” requirements on U.S. lawyers to determine whether their clients are engaging in money laundering or terrorist financing.  This development relates directly to issues about which we previously have blogged, including European perceptions of lawyers as potential gatekeepers and of the United States as a haven for money laundering and tax evasion.  The possible new Model Rule potentially would represent a significant shift in how the U.S. legal profession regards itself and its relationship to its clients.  We hope that you enjoy this discussion by Mr. Zagaris of these important issues. -Peter Hardy

Increasingly, international bodies are calling for higher standards for gatekeepers, known in the parlance of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) as “designated non-financial businesses and professions” (“DNFBPs”). DNFBPs include lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, and trust and company service providers (other than trust companies).  In particular, in the United States, lawyers play a key role in areas that give rise to potential money laundering:  company formation; real estate transactions; business planning; tax planning; wealth management; trust and estate work; and formation and operation of charities, including transnational philanthropy.

In 2006 and again in 2016, the FATF, an intergovernmental body in charge of making and overseeing compliance with international money laundering standards, performed Mutual Evaluation Reports (“MERs”) to assess compliance by the United States with international standards.  While the FATF gave the U.S. high marks generally, both MERs found the U.S. “non-compliant” in gatekeepers and entity transparency.

As a result of this international trend, the ABA’s Task Force on the Gatekeeper and the Profession has prepared and discussed a new ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct that would impose basic “client due diligence” requirement on lawyers.  We discuss this potential new model rule, and the developments which have led to its consideration, below.  Clearly, due diligence for lawyers will increasingly be on the radars of banks, financial institutions, and law firms. Continue Reading AML Due Diligence Standards for U.S. Lawyers

Financial institutions face an increasing risk that alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) requirements will lead to follow-on allegations of securities law violations. We have blogged about investor class action suits against financial institutions based on alleged violations of BSA/AML rules.  We also have blogged about recent enforcement actions by the SEC alleging violations of the securities laws due to underlying violations of the BSA by broker dealers.  This post briefly notes the latest chapter in what seems to be a growing book regarding the convergence of AML/BSA and securities law.

In a complaint, later amended, filed in the Middle District of Tennessee against BancorpSouth Inc., investor plaintiffs alleged that the bank and its CEO, CFO and COO made misleading statements and omissions in SEC filings regarding (1) the bank’s compliance with BSA/AML regulations and the bank’s fair lending practices, and (2) the closing of two pending mergers/acquisitions. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew at the relevant time that the bank was not in compliance with the AML/BSA regulations, due to a pending “target review” by the FDIC – which later resulted in a consent order between the FDIC and the bank regarding its AML obligations – but nonetheless stated that (1) the bank was in compliance with all banking laws and regulations; (2) they expected the two planned mergers to close in the second quarter of 2014; and (3) they expected to receive regulatory approval for those mergers. The plaintiffs allege that defendants thereby violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by making statements which misrepresented or omitted material facts.  According to the plaintiffs, when the AML/BSA problems eventually came to light, these problems allegedly delayed the anticipated mergers, and the bank’s stock value fell significantly, which thereby harmed investors.

As noted, the plaintiffs sued not only the bank itself, but also members of senior management. This approach is consistent with the recent focus on individual liability in AML/BSA matters.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the individual executive defendants:

. . . . were ultimately responsible for ensuring that the Bank maintained an effective BSA/AML compliance program and that the Company’s program complied with the “4 Pillars” of BSA/AML compliance. In fact, federal regulations specifically require that the Company’s BSA/AML compliance program must be in writing, approved by the Board of Directors . . . , and noted in the board minutes.  Defendants were also responsible for creating a “culture of compliance” to ensure Company-wide adherence to the Bank’s BSA/AML policies, procedures and processes, but failed to do so, instead prioritizing . . . cost-cutting measures.

On Monday, the district court granted, for the second time (after having been initially reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), class certification to the plaintiffs against the bank.  The class certification decision involved a review the requirements imposed by Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and  will not be analyzed here. The point for the purposes of this blog is that it has become clear that, in regards to AML/BSA compliance, publically-traded financial institutions are compelled to wage a multi-front war.  Regardless of the actual merits of the complaint against BanccorpSouth, its mere existence reflects that financial institutions must concern themselves not only with FinCEN, the Department of Justice, and the relevant examiner, but also with putative investor plaintiffs and the SEC – thereby increasing the stakes regarding decisions over the disclosure in SEC filings of possible violations of AML/BSA requirements.

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The District Court for the Eastern District of New York has denied motions for acquittal and new trial by a Florida attorney convicted at trial of assisting in an undercover money laundering “sting” operation.

Although the sting operation was orchestrated by an undercover FBI agent, it was modeled on a similar, uncharged and actual scheme to launder the proceeds of fake stock certificates in which the attorney allegedly had participated previously, and which had been run by the defendant’s former client – who introduced the attorney to the undercover FBI agent.  As is typical for money laundering prosecutions of third-party professionals, the key issue was knowledge. Continue Reading “Sting” Money Laundering Scheme and Cooperating Client Ensnares Attorney

On June 5, the SEC filed suit against Salt Lake City-based Alpine Securities, Corp. (“Alpine”). The complaint, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleges that the broker-dealer ran afoul of AML rules by “routinely and systematically” (i) failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) for stock transactions it had flagged as suspicious or, (ii) on thousands of occasions between 2011 and 2015 when Alpine did file SARs, omitting key information, such as the criminal or regulatory history of customers and disclosures as to whether those customers represented a foreign institution.

Under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), Alpine and other broker-dealers must report suspicious transactions in the form of SARs filed with FinCEN. These filings pertain to reports of transactions or patterns of transactions involving at least $5,000 wherein a covered entity “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” that the transaction involves funds representing ill-gotten gains; is intended to hide funds obtained from illegal activities; is designed to evade the BSA; or has no business or apparent lawful purpose and the filing institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction. SARs have a narrative section for the filer to describe the facts of the suspicious incident, which is regarded by law enforcement as a critical section.

The SEC has alleged that Alpine violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 17a-8 promulgated thereunder, which require broker-dealers to comply with the recordkeeping, retention and report obligations of the BSA. Although Alpine had an AML/BSA compliance program (as is required for broker-dealers by both the BSA and FINRA Rule 3310), the complaint alleges that the program was not implemented properly in practice and mischaracterized what Alpine actually did. In part, the SEC alleges that Alpine used two standard templates for SAR filings which did not allow the filer to describe any of the red flags or other material information which caused Alpine to file the SAR. Importantly, the complaint also alleges that FINRA had examined Alpine and brought these deficiencies to its attention, but Alpine thereafter failed to take meaningful steps to address them and “continued its pattern of omitting material red flag and other information from its SARs.”

Much of Alpine’s business involves clearing microcap transactions. Although the broker-dealer has a history of disciplinary action by FINRA, the instant action also reflects a trend by the SEC to use AML rules as a means to combat alleged fraud related to the sale of microcap securities. Earlier this year, New York-based Windsor Street Capital also was charged with failing to file SARs; that matter, currently before an SEC administrative law judge, remains pending. All told, the action against Alpine exemplifies the SEC’s heightened interest in ensuring broker-dealers’ adherence to AML rules and standards. It also reiterates the need for any financial institution to implement effectively in practice its AML compliance plan: the best written compliance plan can turn into the centerpiece of regulators’ allegations if it merely becomes a catalogue of what the financial institution failed to do.

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On June 5th, the United States Supreme Court held in Honeycutt v. United States that a criminal defendant is not jointly and severally liable for property his co-conspirator derived from the crime, and that he only can be ordered to forfeit property he actually obtained from the crime.  Although the decision was unanimous (with Justice Gorsuch abstaining), the outcome was far from preordained.

Until 2015, courts applying the forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, had uniformly held that co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable for amounts received pursuant to the conspiracy.  That rule was adopted by nine circuits.  However, in 2015, the D.C. Circuit split with its sister circuits in United States v. Cano Flores, rejecting joint and several liability for co-conspirators.    The district court in Honeycutt sided with the D.C. Circuit, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, following the overwhelming majority view of the other Courts of Appeal.

The result in Honeycutt, and the underlying analysis and related policy arguments, may have implications in other government enforcement contexts, including in securities cases. Further, the result appears to obligate the government to perform some degree of a tracing analysis to tie individual defendants to specific tainted funds – an analysis which might be difficult in complex fact patterns involving multiple defendants and the use of multiple entities or financial accounts. Continue Reading A Criminal Defendant Cannot Forfeit Property He Never Received

Gavel on sounding block

Ballard Spahr LLP Legal Team Obtains Key Court Victory

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the following post by our colleague and fellow blogger Joanna Kunz.  She was part of a team of Ballard Spahr lawyers who, working pro bono, recently obtained a landmark victory for their client — and for property owners throughout Pennsylvania — when the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a lower court decision defining the parameters of civil forfeiture and arming Pennsylvanians involved in such cases with robust constitutional and statutory protections.  The team also included Jessica Anthony, who argued the case before the Supreme Court, and Jason Leckerman. — Peter D. Hardy

Elizabeth Young is a 72-year-old grandmother whose home and car the government sought to forfeit based on several relatively minor drug sales her adult son conducted out of the house and car. Young fought the forfeiture and lost at the trial level. However, last week the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s en banc reversal of that decision. Its 73-page opinion ends years of uncertainty in the law regarding the constitutional limits on civil forfeiture where the property owner often is not charged with any crime. Continue Reading Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Protections For Property Owners In Landmark Civil Forfeiture Decision

On May 23, the federal court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected an appeal by the majority shareholders in Banca Privada d’Andorra S.A. (“BPA”) regarding claims that FinCEN violated the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing a March 2015 Notice of Finding that the Andorran bank was a financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to impose a special measure pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, effectively cutting off the bank’s access to the U.S. financial system.

Specifically, FinCEN had imposed against BPA the fifth and most severe special measure under Section 311, which prohibits a foreign financial institution from opening or maintaining in the United States through a domestic financial institution a correspondent account or payable-through account. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5).  We previously have blogged about FinCEN’s ability to impose the fifth special measure against foreign financial institutions, which the D.C. Circuit court aptly described in the BPA matter as a possible “death sentence” for smaller foreign banks which rely on access to correspondent accounts in the United States for U.S. dollar clearing.

The appellants had sought two principal claims for relief: (1) an order requiring FinCEN to withdraw the Notices; and (2) a declaration that the Notices were unlawfully issued. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the appellants’ first claim for relief on mootness grounds because FinCEN, once “satisfied that the Bank no longer posed a money laundering concern,” withdrew both Notices after the Andorran government seized BPA and transferred its assets to a bridge bank. However, the appellate court deviated from the analysis of the district court with respect to the second claim for relief by finding that this claim should be dismissed not for mootness, but for lack of standing because the appellants had failed to show that a judicial order would redress effectively their alleged injuries.

The appellants argued that a decision holding that the two Notices were unlawful would redress their injuries because “there is a substantial likelihood that a decision finding that FinCEN improperly labeled [the bank] as of ‘primary money laundering concern’ would materially impact the position of Andorran authorities as to the proper course to be followed with respect to the sale of [the bank’s] assets, what should be done with the corporate structure and any assets that remain, and how the majority shareholders, as [the bank’s] owners, should now be treated in the process.” The D.C. Circuit disagreed, reasoning that even if the appellants had shown injury and causation to support standing, the appellants nonetheless “offered no evidence that the Andorran Government would reverse course as a result of the withdrawal of FinCEN’s Notices” and so “have not shown that the sale actually could be undone even if the Andorran Government were so inclined.”

This case involves unusual facts and procedure and potentially represents a relatively unique holding. Having said that, the opinion more generally reflects how the government can put the “rabbit in the hat” in regards to standing to sue, or lack thereof:  by issuing a “death sentence” under Section 311, FinCEN ultimately deprived the former bank’s majority shareholders of standing to sue over almost certain and severe injury caused by FinCEN – specifically because the death sentence was implemented with such relentless efficiency.  Thus, harm and causation was so clear that, in effect, redress was impossible.

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