As widely reported, the Spanish police raided last year the Madrid offices of the Chinese state-run Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), the world’s biggest bank by assets. In the nearly 18 months following that raid and the numerous arrests made at that time, very little information about this money laundering investigation became known publically. That is, until Reuters recently published a lengthy article resulting from its review of “thousands of pages of confidential case submissions” and its “interviews with investigators and former ICBC employees.” The article raises numerous questions regarding the enforcement of European money laundering laws against Chinese banks operating abroad, as well as certain unique political and diplomatic considerations that may exist in those enforcement efforts. Below, we will compare these efforts with similar U.S. enforcement efforts, which are potentially gaining steam. Continue Reading High-Profile Spanish Money Laundering Investigation of Chinese Bank Raises Questions About Future of Similar U.S. Enforcement
In May 2016, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued its final rule on Customer Due Diligence (CDD) Requirements for Financial Institutions. The Final Rule can be found here; our prior discussion of the Final Rule can be found here.
The new rule requires covered financial institutions to identify and verify the identity of the beneficial owners of all legal entity customers. It also adds CDD as a fifth pillar to the traditional four pillars of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program. The implementation date of May 11, 2018 is less than a year away. How can you ensure that you’ll be ready? Continue Reading FinCEN’s Beneficial Ownership Rule: A Practical Guide to Being Prepared for Implementation
On July 26, FinCEN, in coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California (“NDCA USAO”), assessed a $110,003,314 civil money penalty against BTC-e a/k/a Canton Business Corporation (“BTC-e”) for willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and a $12 million penalty against Alexander Vinnik, a Russian national who is one of the alleged operators of BTC-e, for his role in the violations. FinCEN’s press release indicates that this is the first enforcement action it has taken against a foreign-located money services business (“MSB”) doing business in the United States. As we previously have blogged, FinCEN released interpretive guidance in March 2013 stating that an administrator or exchanger of virtual currency is an MSB under the BSA unless a limitation or exemption applies.
In a parallel criminal investigation, Vinnik was arrested and detained in Greece and charged in a 21-count superseding indictment brought by the NDCA USAO and DOJ’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. The superseding indictment alleges that Vinnik and BTC-e operated an unlicensed MSB doing business in the U.S., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, and committed money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, by facilitating virtual currency transactions involving various crimes, including computer hacking, identity theft, tax refund fraud schemes, public corruption, and drug trafficking. The superseding indictment also provides some clues to the fate of the collapsed virtual currency exchange Mt. Gox, once reportedly the largest such exchange in the world. Continue Reading FinCEN Takes First Action Against Foreign-Located MSB—“The Virtual Currency Exchange of Choice for Criminals”—For Willfully Violating U.S. AML Laws
Part Two of a Three-Part Series
In the second part of this series, we explore the practical effects of the FinCEN and DOJ guidance documents on industries attempting to serve marijuana related business (“MRBs”). On June 27, 2017, the Tenth Circuit issued an interesting and divided opinion showing us how difficult it can be to square the prohibitions in the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) and money laundering statutes with state legislation legalizing certain MRB activity and the seemingly permissive nature of the FinCEN and DOJ guidance documents. Continue Reading Continued and Unexpected Roadblocks to Serving the Marijuana Industry: Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank
Part One of a Three-Part Series
We begin this week with a three-part series on banking and the marijuana industry. States continue to pass medical and recreational use marijuana legislation despite that the fact that the substance remains classified as a Schedule I drug subject to the federal Controlled Substances Act. Thus, the medical and recreational marijuana industries continue to struggle with access to banking and credit, and those who attempt to serve these industries find themselves subject to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and the criminal money laundering provisions. As we will detail this week, the struggle for financial institutions attempting to service the marijuana industry comes not only from the BSA and AML provisions, but in other forms. We start this week with an overview of the guidance documents issued by the federal government which identify the enforcement priorities and also potential windows for financial institutions to service the marijuana industry. We will follow up with a discussion of a recent federal court decision illustrating the practical difficulties of squaring the prohibitions of the federal drug laws with permissive state laws and the federal guidance documents. We will conclude with an exploration of how federal agencies beyond the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), can further muddy these waters by staking out their own regulatory and enforcement priorities. –Priya Roy Continue Reading Banking and the Marijuana Industry
On June 5, the SEC filed suit against Salt Lake City-based Alpine Securities, Corp. (“Alpine”). The complaint, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleges that the broker-dealer ran afoul of AML rules by “routinely and systematically” (i) failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) for stock transactions it had flagged as suspicious or, (ii) on thousands of occasions between 2011 and 2015 when Alpine did file SARs, omitting key information, such as the criminal or regulatory history of customers and disclosures as to whether those customers represented a foreign institution.
Under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), Alpine and other broker-dealers must report suspicious transactions in the form of SARs filed with FinCEN. These filings pertain to reports of transactions or patterns of transactions involving at least $5,000 wherein a covered entity “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” that the transaction involves funds representing ill-gotten gains; is intended to hide funds obtained from illegal activities; is designed to evade the BSA; or has no business or apparent lawful purpose and the filing institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction. SARs have a narrative section for the filer to describe the facts of the suspicious incident, which is regarded by law enforcement as a critical section.
The SEC has alleged that Alpine violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 17a-8 promulgated thereunder, which require broker-dealers to comply with the recordkeeping, retention and report obligations of the BSA. Although Alpine had an AML/BSA compliance program (as is required for broker-dealers by both the BSA and FINRA Rule 3310), the complaint alleges that the program was not implemented properly in practice and mischaracterized what Alpine actually did. In part, the SEC alleges that Alpine used two standard templates for SAR filings which did not allow the filer to describe any of the red flags or other material information which caused Alpine to file the SAR. Importantly, the complaint also alleges that FINRA had examined Alpine and brought these deficiencies to its attention, but Alpine thereafter failed to take meaningful steps to address them and “continued its pattern of omitting material red flag and other information from its SARs.”
Much of Alpine’s business involves clearing microcap transactions. Although the broker-dealer has a history of disciplinary action by FINRA, the instant action also reflects a trend by the SEC to use AML rules as a means to combat alleged fraud related to the sale of microcap securities. Earlier this year, New York-based Windsor Street Capital also was charged with failing to file SARs; that matter, currently before an SEC administrative law judge, remains pending. All told, the action against Alpine exemplifies the SEC’s heightened interest in ensuring broker-dealers’ adherence to AML rules and standards. It also reiterates the need for any financial institution to implement effectively in practice its AML compliance plan: the best written compliance plan can turn into the centerpiece of regulators’ allegations if it merely becomes a catalogue of what the financial institution failed to do.
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On May 23, the federal court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected an appeal by the majority shareholders in Banca Privada d’Andorra S.A. (“BPA”) regarding claims that FinCEN violated the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing a March 2015 Notice of Finding that the Andorran bank was a financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to impose a special measure pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, effectively cutting off the bank’s access to the U.S. financial system.
Specifically, FinCEN had imposed against BPA the fifth and most severe special measure under Section 311, which prohibits a foreign financial institution from opening or maintaining in the United States through a domestic financial institution a correspondent account or payable-through account. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5). We previously have blogged about FinCEN’s ability to impose the fifth special measure against foreign financial institutions, which the D.C. Circuit court aptly described in the BPA matter as a possible “death sentence” for smaller foreign banks which rely on access to correspondent accounts in the United States for U.S. dollar clearing.
The appellants had sought two principal claims for relief: (1) an order requiring FinCEN to withdraw the Notices; and (2) a declaration that the Notices were unlawfully issued. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the appellants’ first claim for relief on mootness grounds because FinCEN, once “satisfied that the Bank no longer posed a money laundering concern,” withdrew both Notices after the Andorran government seized BPA and transferred its assets to a bridge bank. However, the appellate court deviated from the analysis of the district court with respect to the second claim for relief by finding that this claim should be dismissed not for mootness, but for lack of standing because the appellants had failed to show that a judicial order would redress effectively their alleged injuries.
The appellants argued that a decision holding that the two Notices were unlawful would redress their injuries because “there is a substantial likelihood that a decision finding that FinCEN improperly labeled [the bank] as of ‘primary money laundering concern’ would materially impact the position of Andorran authorities as to the proper course to be followed with respect to the sale of [the bank’s] assets, what should be done with the corporate structure and any assets that remain, and how the majority shareholders, as [the bank’s] owners, should now be treated in the process.” The D.C. Circuit disagreed, reasoning that even if the appellants had shown injury and causation to support standing, the appellants nonetheless “offered no evidence that the Andorran Government would reverse course as a result of the withdrawal of FinCEN’s Notices” and so “have not shown that the sale actually could be undone even if the Andorran Government were so inclined.”
This case involves unusual facts and procedure and potentially represents a relatively unique holding. Having said that, the opinion more generally reflects how the government can put the “rabbit in the hat” in regards to standing to sue, or lack thereof: by issuing a “death sentence” under Section 311, FinCEN ultimately deprived the former bank’s majority shareholders of standing to sue over almost certain and severe injury caused by FinCEN – specifically because the death sentence was implemented with such relentless efficiency. Thus, harm and causation was so clear that, in effect, redress was impossible.
If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch.
Settlement of FinCEN Action Against Former AML Chief Compliance Officer Serves as Possible Bellwether of Future Cases
This post discusses individual liability in AML/BSA enforcement, which is an area of increasing attention. Indeed, according to public statements by the government, individual liability is the focus of enhanced scrutiny across the enforcement table.
Although the raw number of enforcement actions against individuals in the AML/BSA realm (or even in the broader realm of general financial crime) has not climbed dramatically, even a few enforcement actions can have a profound effect on an industry – and that appears to be occurring in the AML realm. We begin our discussion here with a recent settlement of a high-profile enforcement action against a former AML compliance officer, and how it highlights potential individual liability. Ironically, special scrutiny can apply to the very people specifically tasked with maximizing compliance at a corporation, and such scrutiny can end up pitting them against a company’s management and board. Continue Reading Individual Accountability in AML Cases
We were pleased to contribute an article to the May 2017 issue of Business Crimes Bulletin titled “The Growing Convergence of Cyber-Related Crime and Suspicious Activity Reporting.” Regulators and law enforcement are taking proactive steps to further leverage anti-money laundering monitoring and reporting tools in their battle with cyber attacks and cyber crimes. In-house legal and compliance teams need to be fully versed in the latest Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and bank regulatory guidance on cyber-related crimes and have the right professionals available to assist them with these matters.
Cyber-related crimes increasingly are making headlines across the globe as cyber attacks and other cyber incidents grow in intensity, volume and sophistication against government, political and business targets. The motives of attackers are as varied as their methods, but there is clearly an increasing number of attacks and other illegal activity motivated by financial gain against businesses, including financial institutions. Recent regulatory developments reveal that that illegal cyber activity has become more relevant to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing as well.
Click here to read the full article.
Reprinted with permission from the May 2017 issue of Business Crimes Bulletin.
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A Guest Blog by Greg Baer, President of The Clearing House
Today we are very pleased to welcome guest blogger Greg Baer, who will address a series of significant issues posed by a detailed paper published by The Clearing House, a banking association and payments company that is owned by the largest commercial banks and dates back to 1853. The paper, titled A New Paradigm: Redesigning the U.S. AML/CFT Framework to Protect National Security and Aid Law Enforcement (The New Paradigm), analyzes the effectiveness of the current AML and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime, identifies problems with that regime, and proposes a series of reforms to remedy them.
Mr. Baer is the President of The Clearinghouse Association L.L.C. and the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. The Clearing House Association represents the interests of The Clearing House’s commercial bank ownership on a diverse range of regulatory and legislative matters. Its affiliate, The Clearing House Payments Company, is the only private-sector ACH and wire operator in the United States, clearing and settling nearly $2 trillion in U.S. dollar payments each day, representing half of all commercial ACH and wire volume. Prior to joining The Clearing House, Mr. Baer was Managing Director and Head of Regulatory Policy at JPMorgan Chase. He previously served as Deputy General Counsel for Corporate Law at Bank of America, and as a partner at Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr. He also served as Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, after serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Finally, Mr. Baer was managing senior counsel at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The New Paradigm is the product of two closed-door symposia that convened approximately 60 leading experts in the field of AML/CFT. The group included senior former and current officials from law enforcement, national security, bank regulation and domestic policy; leaders of prominent think tanks in the areas of economic policy, development, and national security; consultants and lawyers practicing in the field; FinTech CEOs; and the heads of AML/CFT at multiple major financial institutions. This blog post takes the form of a Q & A session, in which Mr. Baer responds to questions posed by Money Laundering Watch and explains the main positions set forth in The New Paradigm, and also replies to some potential counter-arguments. We hope you enjoy this discussion of these important issues. Continue Reading The New Paradigm: Proposed Reforms of the AML/CFT Regime by The Clearing House