Department of Justice (DOJ)

Settlement of FinCEN Action Against Former AML Chief Compliance Officer Serves as Possible Bellwether of Future Cases

This post discusses individual liability in AML/BSA enforcement, which is an area of increasing attention. Indeed, according to public statements by the government, individual liability is the focus of enhanced scrutiny across the enforcement table.

Man looking over shoulder with suspicionAlthough the raw number of enforcement actions against individuals in the AML/BSA realm (or even in the broader realm of general financial crime) has not climbed dramatically, even a few enforcement actions can have a profound effect on an industry – and that appears to be occurring in the AML realm. We begin our discussion here with a recent settlement of a high-profile enforcement action against a former AML compliance officer, and how it highlights potential individual liability.  Ironically, special scrutiny can apply to the very people specifically tasked with maximizing compliance at a corporation, and such scrutiny can end up pitting them against a company’s management and board. Continue Reading Individual Accountability in AML Cases

Department_of_Justice_Office_of_the_Inspector_General_seal_svgIn this post, we consider the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General report (OIG Report), released on March 29, 2017, evaluating the DOJ’s oversight of its cash seizure and forfeiture operations.  This post is a companion to yesterday’s piece addressing the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)’s recent report on IRS civil forfeiture for structuring violations.  Read in tandem, the OIG and TIGTA Reports suggest that many forfeitures occur without conclusive information about the details of the potential underlying crime, or even whether an underlying crime was involved at all.  The OIG Report concludes that more robust investigations and data collection on forfeitures would both allow DOJ monitor the effectiveness of its forfeiture efforts and increase public confidence in the forfeiture process.  Improved investigations and data collection also may lead to greater enforcement opportunities by tying forfeitures to ongoing investigations or initiating new enforcement actions based on findings in forfeiture investigations.

This OIG Report is the latest in a series of recent OIG evaluations of DOJ forfeiture initiatives which respond, at least in part, to civil liberties concerns raised by forfeiture reform advocates. (See OIG’s January 2015 report on so-called “cold” consent encounters at mass transit facilities, and its September 2012 investigation of forfeiture enforcement by a local Florida police department).  Both of those investigations concluded that more data analysis was needed to ensure that forfeiture operations were serving legitimate law enforcement interests.

The most recent report continues with the same theme, finding that the DOJ and its investigative components do not collect or use sufficient data to properly oversee seizure operations, or to determine whether those operations relate to or benefit criminal investigations. The OIG report focuses on three main topics:  (1) the lack of data assessing the relationship between seizure and forfeiture activities and investigative outcomes; (2) in the absence of such data, the OIG itself sampled 100 DEA cash seizures that had characteristics OIG believed made them “particularly susceptible to civil liberties concerns”; and (3) the DOJ’s relationship to state and local law enforcement, through both training and equitable sharing arrangements.  This post addresses topics (1) and (2).  As we have previously written, equitable sharing arrangements raise their own issues of balancing individual property rights against law enforcement objectives, which are conceptually distinct from the issues addressed here. Continue Reading Civil Forfeiture Under Fire – Part II

IED Bomb still lifeOn March 24, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging Kassim Tajideen, an alleged prominent financial supporter of the Hizballah terror organization, with evading U.S. sanctions and conspiring to commit money laundering.  Tajideen, of Beirut, Lebanon, was arrested in Morocco earlier this month and has made his initial appearance in federal court in Washington, D.C.

According to the government, Tajideen, through his multi-billion dollar network of businesses based in Lebanon and Africa, contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah. For this reason, in May 2009, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated Tajidden as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”).  This designation makes it illegal for U.S. companies to do business with Tajideen or any entity that he controls.  More broadly, it is illegal for U.S. companies to transact business with any entities or individuals on OFAC’s blacklists.

The indictment charges Tajideen with one count of conspiracy to evade U.S. sanctions, specifically the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, by transacting business with three U.S. businesses, referred to only as Business A, Business B and Business C, and by concealing from OFAC that he was benefitting from these transactions. Tajideen is also charged with seven counts of unlawful transactions with a SDGT, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.

According to the indictment, Tajideen heads a large-scale commodity distribution business based primarily in Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and Angola, but which operates throughout the world, including in the U.S. The business utilized what the government says was “a web of vertically integrated companies, partnerships and trade names.” The indictment further alleges that Tajideen and others engaged in a scheme to do business with U.S. companies while concealing Tajideen’s involvement.  As part of that scheme, between approximately July 2013 and the present, Tajideen, his employee, codefendant Imad Hassoun, and other unnamed co-conspirators illegally caused at least 47 wire transfers totaling over $27 million to be sent to entities in the U.S. for the purchase of frozen poultry and other items.  These payments caused the U.S. entities to illegally ship goods from the U.S. without obtaining the proper licenses from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), charges that Tajideen and others conspired to both promote and conceal the conspirators’ illegal business transactions with U.S. persons through numerous wire transfers from bank accounts held by Tajideen’s companies in the United Arab Emirates to bank accounts held within the U.S. in order to pay for transactions involving Businesses A, B and C.

It has been reported that the investigation is continuing. Specifically, the government wants to determine whether Businesses A, B or C knowingly did business with Tajideen after he was designated a SDGT. Tajideen is alleged to have restructured his business empire after the designation and to have created new trade names in order to evade the sanctions and continue doing business with U.S. companies.  But Tajideen’s alleged deception may not save Businesses A, B and C from the government’s crosshairs.  Companies are responsible for conducting due diligence to determine whether entities and individuals with whom they do business – including middlemen, corporate shells and newly formed firms – are linked to individuals or entities on OFAC’s blacklists.  So while this indictment shows that the U.S. is taking aggressive action against Hizballah, it also underscores the need for U.S. companies to have robust export control compliance programs so that they can ensure they are not doing business with terrorists.

The U.S. money laundering statutes have a broad global reach and may be used to prosecute cases involving alleged schemes perpetrated almost entirely outside of the United States. These types of allegations seem to be an increasingly common fact pattern as cross-border cases proliferate and U.S. prosecutions more often involve conduct occurring largely overseas. A recent indictment fits squarely within this trend.

GlobeThe U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently announced the unsealing of four related and complex indictments returned in the District of Columbia; according to the DOJ press release, 19 people were charged “with taking part in various international fraud and money laundering conspiracies that led to more than $13 million in losses[.]” The press release credited a broad array of law enforcement agencies, including Interpol. Again emphasizing the international aspect of the indictments, the press release stated that “[s]ixteen of the 19 defendants were arrested . . . . in New York and Los Angeles, as well as Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and Israel[,]” and that “[t]he arrests followed a multi-year investigative effort by federal and international law enforcement agencies to target multimillion-dollar fraud and money laundering schemes perpetrated by a transnational organized crime network.”

The four indictments are lengthy and we will discuss only one of them, in order to focus on the potentially broad jurisdictional reach of the “international” money laundering provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). Continue Reading Indictments Spotlight Broad Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Money Laundering Statutes

The Western Union Company (“Western Union”) entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) on January 19th with the Department of Justice, based on alleged willful failures to maintain an effective AML program and the aiding and abetting of wire fraud.  The DPA involved a combined $586 million monetary penalty and also involved related civil enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission and FinCEN.  The agreement has been well-publicized and its details will not be repeated here; very generally, the DPA rests on allegations involving conduct stretching from 2004 through 2012 and an overall failure by Western Union to detect and prevent a kaleidoscope of illicit behavior by customers, from structured transactions to an international consumer fraud scheme to potential drug distribution.  To be sure, this is a significant agreement – but it echoes the same general sort of facts and allegations which have become almost standard in large AML enforcement actions. However, the Western Union action contains at least one interesting wrinkle. Continue Reading The Western Union DPA and the Need to Investigate One’s Own

In part two of our review of the 2016 developments in Anti-Money Laundering (AML), the Bank Secrecy Act, (BSA), the criminal money laundering statutes, forfeiture, and related issues, we discuss four additional key topics:

You can read more about these topics areas in the blogs that follow.  Click here to read the full article 2016 Year in Review: Money Laundering (Part Two).  Click here if you missed Part One of our 2016 year in review.

The federal courts continued in 2016 to produce a stream of cases pertaining to money laundering. We focus on three below because they involve analysis of basic issues that frequently arise in money laundering litigation.

Justitia, a monument in Frankfurt, Germany

The first case tests the money laundering statute’s reach in prosecution of an alleged international fraud perpetrated primarily outside of the United States—an increasingly common fact pattern as cross-border cases proliferate and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutes more conduct occurring largely overseas. The other two cases involve defense victories that focus on critical issues of mental state: the question of specific intent under the BSA, and the question, under the money laundering statutes, of knowledge by a third party that a transaction involved proceeds of another person’s crime. The issue of third-party knowledge is often crucial in prosecutions of professionals. Continue Reading 2016 Year End Review: Money Laundering Opinions of Note

House and cashThe field of forfeiture saw significant action in 2016. The IRS offered to return forfeited funds used in structuring, but Congress still may clip its ability to forfeit such funds. Meanwhile, DOJ renewed a controversial program that incentivizes local law enforcement to aggressively pursue forfeiture. It filed a major forfeiture action which reminds law firms of their own need to vet the source of funds flowing into firm bank accounts. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that “clean” funds cannot be restrained pretrial when a defendant needs those funds for his criminal defense, even if the government wants to restrain the money in order to pay for forfeiture or restitution if the defendant is convicted. Continue Reading 2016 Year in Review: Forfeiture