The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) recently released a special report on professional money launderers (“PMLs”) who provide money laundering expertise and services to their crime-committing clients. The Report describes the functions and characteristics of a PML and the services they provide. Although the FATF has issued many reports on potential vulnerabilities in anti-money laundering efforts, this Report focuses on the affirmative threats posed by money laundering regimes.

The Report is primarily descriptive, and contains examples of enforcement actions involving PMLs across the globe. A non-public version of the Report, available to Members of the FATF and the FATF Global Network, sets forth practical recommendations for the detection, investigation, prosecution, and prevention of PML-related laundering, including “appropriate regulation,” law enforcement coordination, and international co-operation and information exchange. Presumably, the Report will provide additional fuel to efforts across the world to close perceived regulatory gaps involving the collection of beneficial ownership information, and the potential role of professionals, including lawyers, in assisting others to launder illicit funds. Continue Reading FATF Report: Professional Money Laundering and Related Threats

Earlier this month, the District Court for the Central District of California imposed a prison sentence of one year and a day, with three years of supervised release, on defendant Theresa Lynn Tetley, who had pleaded guilty to: (i) the unlicensed operation of a digital currency exchange due to failure register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) and (b)(1)(B), and (ii) a money laundering charge, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B), arising out of an undercover “sting” operation run by the Drug Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation involving the attempt to conceal proceeds supposedly obtained by selling drugs.  Tetley also was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine and forfeit 40 Bitcoin, $292,264 in cash, and 25 gold bars that were the alleged proceeds of her illegal activity.

The Court imposed a sentence significantly lower than the sentence of 30 months requested by the government, a recommendation which already was lower than the advisory sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) of 46 to 57 months in prison, as calculated by the U.S. Probation Office.

Tetley, a 50 year old woman living in Southern California, is a former stockbroker and real estate investor. She operated her digital currency exchange under the alias “Bitcoin Maven” for over three years, running an unregistered Bitcoin for cash exchange service.  According to the government, her service “fueled a black-market financial system” that “purposely and deliberately existed outside the regulated bank industry” and which catered to an alleged major darknet vendor of illegal narcotics.  According to the defense, however, the defendant “departed from a lifetime of integrity and good deeds and showed terrible judgment by failing to comply with federal registration requirements and buying bitcoins from individuals who represented themselves as engaged in criminal activity.”

In this post, we will drill into this sentencing and the parties’ respective positions, which provide a window into the prosecution and sentencing of alleged crimes involving both digital currency and undercover money laundering operations — and into the process for the sentencing of federal crimes in general, and how other factors which are entirely unrelated to the facts of the specific offense can be important.  Further, the Tetley case is interesting in part because it represents a sort of “hybrid” case — seen from time to time in money laundering cases involving professionals — which straddles both the typically very different realms of “pure” financial crime cases and illegal narcotics cases.  The government sentencing memorandum is here; the defense sentencing memorandum is here. Continue Reading Unlicensed Bit Coin Exchange Operator Sentenced to One Year and a Day for Attempted Money Laundering in Undercover Sting Operation and Failure to Register with FinCEN

The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced last week that it was disbanding the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, established under the Obama Administration. In its place, pursuant to an Executive Order, the DOJ plans to establish the Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud (“Task Force”). The purpose—according to a DOJ press release—is to deter fraud on consumers and the government. Additionally, the Task Force will focus on money laundering, “including the recovery of proceeds;” fraud related to digital currency; tax fraud; health care fraud; securities and commodities fraud; and other financial crimes.

The Task Force is a multiagency effort. Although the DOJ will lead the group under Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, the Executive Order directs him to include a host of other federal agencies, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Chairperson of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

This is a potentially important development regarding government enforcement, including as to money laundering. We and our colleague Alan Kaplinsky therefore discuss the new DOJ task force in detail here.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. To learn more about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team, please click here.

Exterior of the Robert F. Kennedy U.S. Department of Justice Building in Washington, D.C.

In a highly anticipated speech to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute this morning, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced two new Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policies: first, a directive encouraging “coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct,” and second, the establishment of a new Working Group on Corporate Enforcement and Accountability designed to foster consistency in DOJ outcomes surrounding white collar crime and corporate compliance.

Although Deputy A.G. Rosenstein did not discuss specifically enforcement actions involving money laundering or violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), his remarks and guidance clearly will apply to such actions, because they will apply  to all corporate investigations and prosecutions. Indeed, the high-profile actions against financial institutions involving alleged AML/BSA and/or OFAC violations which we have seen over the years invariably involve numerous enforcement agencies, including but not necessarily limited to DOJ, FBI, IRS, FinCEN, the OCC, and/or state agencies — with each agency looking to assert its own particular role and agenda, sometimes to the bewilderment and detriment of the company.

This is an important development for institutions undergoing government scrutiny. I and my colleagues Hank Hockeimer, Jr. and Thomas Burke therefore discuss Deputy A.G. Rosenstein’s speech in detail here.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. To learn more about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team, please click here.

As forecasted in a blog post last summer, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has again used the money laundering statute to accomplish the otherwise elusive goal of prosecuting foreign officials who allegedly receive bribes. On Monday, DOJ unsealed its Indictment against five Venezuelans employed by or closely connected to Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (“PDVSA”), the Venezuelan state-owned and state-controlled oil company.

The unsealing of the charges against these five Venezuelan individuals marks the latest development in a multi-year effort by DOJ to investigate and prosecute bribery at PDVSA. As DOJ’s press release notes, ten individuals have already pleaded guilty in the investigation thus far.  Key among these individuals are Roberto Enrique Rincon Fernandez and Abraham Jose Shiera Bastidas, two American businessmen who pleaded guilty in 2016 to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”) for paying bribes to PDVSA.  In connection with their pleas, the two admitted to paying PDVSA bribes in order to win lucrative energy contracts and to be given payment priority over other PDVSA vendors during a time when PDVSA faced a liquidity crisis.

Last October, more than one year after these guilty pleas, Spanish police announced the arrests of four of the five individuals named in Monday’s Indictment.  The arrests were described as “part of a months-long sting ordered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.”  Currently, three of the defendants remain in Spain pending extradition, the fourth was extradited to the United States and made his initial appearance last Friday, and the fifth remains at large.

As noted above, the Indictment is notable for using the money laundering statute to accomplish what the FCPA statute cannot—bringing charges against a foreign official. Last summer, we blogged about the conviction and sentencing of Guinea’s former Minister of Mines and Geology.  There, we noted the FCPA generally prohibits individuals and businesses from paying bribes to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.  However, “foreign officials” cannot be charged under the FCPA or with conspiracy to violate it.  Therefore, a foreign official could not be prosecuted for his conduct in soliciting or receiving bribes under the FCPA. Continue Reading DOJ Employs Money Laundering Statute to Prosecute Venezuelan Oilmen for Foreign Bribery

Mexico City’s downtown and Palacio de Bellas Artes building at twilight

Last week, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) issued a report concluding that Mexico needs to “step up efforts in pursuing money launderers.” The report, which summarized the FATF’s findings from its on-site assessment in early 2017, identified three particularly weak areas in Mexico’s AML regime:  preventative measures; investigation and prosecution; and confiscation.  This post summarizes the report’s findings, and observes that Mexico is not the only nation needing to “step up” its efforts.  Further, given the strong financial and geographic ties between Mexico and the U.S., the AML challenges of Mexico can be the challenges of the U.S. Continue Reading Mexico’s AML Regime Evaluated by the FATF: Systemic Improvement, but Suspicious Transaction Reporting and Law Enforcement Efforts Continue to Struggle

Attorney General Sessions Announces Rescission of Obama Administration Policies on Marijuana Enforcement; Financial Institutions Lose Grounds to Permit Financial Transactions with Marijuana Businesses

In a single-page memorandum issued today, Attorney General Sessions tersely rescinded a string of DOJ enforcement policies announced during the Obama Administration — chief among them the “Cole Memo,” described below — which collectively had indicated that although marijuana was still illegal under federal drug laws and the DOJ would continue its enforcement of those laws, the DOJ also would defer to state governments that had developed regulatory regimes legalizing marijuana under defined circumstances.  Although Attorney General Sessions is well known for his personal distaste for marijuana-related activity, he previously had not been entirely clear as to exactly what position his DOJ would take in regards to the Cole Memo and related enforcement.

Although this policy change has many potential implications, its primary relevance to Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”), the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and money laundering issues is that the Cole Memo had provided the support for the federal government to issue guidance that, under very defined circumstances, financial institutions could provide services to state-licensed marijuana businesses. Continue Reading Marijuana Enforcement: DOJ Cole Memo Up in Smoke

U.K. Think Tank Report Criticizes International AML Reporting Regimes

First in a Three-Part Series of Blog Posts

The Royal United Services Institute (“RUSI”) for Defence and Security Studies — a U.K. think tank – has released a study:  The Role of Financial Information-Sharing Partnerships in the Disruption of Crime (the “Study”).  The Study focuses on international efforts — including efforts by the United States — regarding the reporting of suspicious transactions, money laundering, and terrorist financing.  The Study is a critique of current approaches to AML reporting.

In this first blog post on the Study, we will describe some of the criticisms set forth by the Study regarding the general effectiveness of suspicious activity reporting. Some of these criticisms will ring true with U.S. financial institutions, and echo in part criticisms previously raised by a detailed paper published by The Clearing House, a banking association and payments company. That paper, titled A New Paradigm: Redesigning the U.S. AML/CFT Framework to Protect National Security and Aid Law Enforcement (“The New Paradigm”), analyzes the effectiveness of the current AML and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime in the U.S., identifies problems with that regime, and proposes reforms.  As we previously have blogged, The New Paradigm has argued that the regime for filing SARs is outdated, that “the combined data set [from filed SARs] has massive amounts of noise and little information of use to law enforcement,” and that “the SAR database includes no feedback loop [and] . . . . there is no mechanism for law enforcement to provide feedback on whether a given SAR produced a lead or was never utilized.”  These same criticisms are repeated in the Study, which looked at AML systems in the U.S, the U.K, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and Canada.  Although suspicious activity reporting is generally considered to be the engine which drives AML and money laundering enforcement by the government, the Study asserts: “Interviews with past and present {Financial Intelligence Units] heads as part of this project consistently raised figures of between 80% and 90% of [such reporting] being of no operational value to active law enforcement investigations.” Continue Reading Suspicious Activity Reports Rarely Provide “Operational Value” to Law Enforcement Investigations