Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

New York State Encourages Banking for State-Licensed Medical Marijuana Businesses – Whereas a Maine Company Runs Into Trouble, Despite State Law Legalizing Medical Marijuana

To state the obvious, growing and dispensing marijuana is still illegal under federal law.  As a result, being involved in even a state-licensed marijuana business can be risky. Moreover, obtaining financial services for such a business is sometimes impossible, primarily due to the federal anti-money laundering (“AML”) obligations imposed upon financial institutions by the Bank Secrecy Act (as we have blogged).

This post discusses two recent developments related to state-licensed medical marijuana operations, which serve as contrasting bookends to the spectrum of potential risks and opportunities presented by such businesses.  On the risk-end of the spectrum, we discuss the recent difficulties encountered by a Maine business, and how dubious the seeming safe harbor of state legalization of marijuana can be in some cases. On the opportunity-end of the spectrum, we discuss recent guidance issued by the New York Department of Financial Services, which has declared its support and encouragement of state-chartered banks and credit unions to offer banking services to medical marijuana related businesses licensed by New York State. Continue Reading The Medical Marijuana Industry and AML: Opportunities and Risks

Conduct Performed Without Knowledge Still Can Lead to the Most Serious Penalties

Under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), the most onerous civil penalties will be applied for “willful” violations. That mental state standard might sound hard for the government to prove.  For example, in criminal and civil tax fraud cases under the Internal Revenue Code, “willfulness” is defined to mean a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty – a very demanding showing. But as we will discuss, two very new court opinions discussing a required BSA filing – a Form TD F 90-22.1, or Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, otherwise know as a FBAR – remind us that, under the BSA, a “willful” violation does not require proof of actual knowledge. A “willful” BSA violation only needs to be reckless, and the government can prove it through the doctrine of “willful blindness” or “conscious avoidance.”

The fact that courts in civil FBAR cases have been holding that “willfulness” can mean “just recklessness” is not a new development, and it is well known to those practicing in the tax fraud and tax controversy space. This blog post will not attempt to delve into the long-running offshore account enforcement campaign that has been waged by the IRS and the DOJ; the related case decisions; or the related voluntary disclosure programs for offshore accounts (for those interested in this fascinating but complicated topic, the Federal Tax Crimes blog is one of many excellent resources). Rather, the point of this post is that the case law now being made in the FBAR and offshore account context will have direct application to more traditional Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”)/BSA enforcement actions, because the civil penalty statute being interpreted in the FBAR cases is the same provision which applies to claimed failures to maintain an adequate AML program and other violations of the BSA.  Thus, the target audience of this post is not people involved in undisclosed offshore bank account cases, but rather people involved in day-to-day AML compliance for financial institutions, who may not realize that some missteps may be branded as “willful” and entail very serious monetary penalties, even if they were done without actual knowledge.  This may be news to some, and it underscores in particular the risks presented by one the topics that this blog frequently has discussed: the potential AML liability of individuals. Continue Reading The BSA Civil Penalty Regime: Reckless Conduct Can Produce “Willful” Penalties

The ABA Journal is accepting nominations for the Web 100, its annual list of the top legal blogs, podcasts, and social media. If you enjoy reading Money Laundering Watch, we would be very grateful if you will show your support by nominating our blog for the 2018 edition of the list.  The nomination process is easy to do.

Since its launch in 2017, Money Laundering Watch has become the go-to place for the latest insights into the world of money laundering, anti-money laundering, the Bank Secrecy Act, and related topics. We strive to provide unique, substantive and accessible analysis.  Here are just a few past highlights, reflecting the fascinating spectrum of the topics we cover:

Nominations are due by August 7. We are honored to be read by so many people from throughout the world and from so many sectors, including business and finance, law, government, academia, and journalism. We greatly appreciate your support now and throughout the year!

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. To learn more about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team, please click here.

Second Part of a Two-Part Series

As we blogged yesterday, British Columbia’s (“B.C.”) Attorney General David Eby recently released an independent and very detailed report examining money laundering in B.C.’s gaming industry and providing 48 recommendations to combat the problem. See Peter M. German, QC, Dirty Money: An Independent Review of Money Laundering in Lower Mainland Casinos conducted for the Attorney General of British Columbia (Mar. 31, 2018) (“German Report”).  As we noted yesterday, when discussing the U.S. regulatory system, the German Report favorably cites the Nevada Gaming Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board, whose Enforcement Division “acts as a first line of defence against organized crime and bulk cash buy-ins[,]” and further observes that the federal Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “[i]n partnership with Internal Revenue Service, acts as the enforcement arm for most money laundering issues.”

The U.S.’s more robust, streamlined AML regulatory regime, although hardly perfect, stands in stark contrast to the dysfunction alleged in the German Report that plagues B.C.’s current framework. In this post, we describe the U.S. AML regulatory regime for the gaming industry, and the recent enforcement actions which it has produced.  Although the pace of AML enforcement has been somewhat sporadic, it appears to be increasing over time in regards to the gaming industry.  Certainly, attention by regulators — as well as by the industry itself — to AML/BSA compliance has increased over the last several years.

Continue Reading The U.S. Casino and Gaming Industry: AML/BSA Regulation and Enforcement

U.S. Regulatory Regime Favorably Cited in Report for B.C. Attorney General

First Part in a Two-Part Series on Gaming Industry and AML

British Columbia’s (“B.C.”) Attorney General David Eby recently released an independent and very detailed report examining money laundering in B.C.’s gaming industry and providing 48 recommendations to combat the problem. Eby appointed Peter German, a former deputy police commissioner and leading expert on money laundering, to conduct a six-month investigation into allegations of money laundering in the Lower Mainland casinos after reports emerged that one Vancouver-based casino accepted $13.5 million in $20 bills over the course of one month in 2015.  See Peter M. German, QC, Dirty Money: An Independent Review of Money Laundering in Lower Mainland Casinos Conducted for the Attorney General of British Columbia (Mar. 31, 2018) (“German Report”)

Following German’s investigation, which included over 150 interviews with industry and government insiders in B.C., Ontario, and the United States, German issued the German Report to detail his findings and recommendations. The report reveals that a multitude of alleged criminal syndicates, tied primarily to China, have used Vancouver-area casinos to launder money.  It highlights the anti-money laundering (“AML”) challenges faced by a predominantly cashed-based industry, and also underscores the systemic issues that have made B.C.’s gaming industry an alleged breeding ground for money laundering: a dysfunctional, fragmented regulatory regime that lacks independence.  To streamline and strengthen B.C.’s regulatory framework, the German Report recommends creating an independent gaming regulator analogous to the regulatory regime in the United States.  The German Report focuses on the Nevada Gaming Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board, whose Enforcement Division “acts as a first line of defence against organized crime and bulk cash buy-ins[,]” whereas the federal Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “[i]n partnership with Internal Revenue Service, acts as the enforcement arm for most money laundering issues.”

In announcing the German Report, Eby blamed the former Liberal government for “turn[ing] a blind eye to the escalating money laundering in B.C. casinos.” He also stated his acceptance of all 48 of these recommendations.

In this post, we will describe the findings and recommendations of the German Report.  In the next post, we will contrast the B.C. regulatory regime described in the German Report with the AML regulatory regime in the United States involving the gaming industry, and the recent enforcement actions which it has produced.

Continue Reading British Columbia’s Gaming Industry Reportedly Faces Serious Money Laundering Vulnerabilities

 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a statement earlier this week regarding testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Committee on Financial Services regarding the potential perils of “derisking.”

As described by the GAO, “derisking is the practice of depository institutions limiting certain services or ending their relationships with customers to, among other things, avoid perceived regulatory concerns about facilitating money laundering or other criminal activity such as financing to terrorist groups.” Derisking is a significant ongoing issue in AML-related enforcement.  As we have blogged, the U.S. Treasury Department previously attempted to allay the fears driving the phenomenon of derisking by (i) suggesting that U.S. banks have overreacted to concerns over AML/BSA enforcement by unnecessarily terminating correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks; (ii) noting that these relationships are crucial to the global economy; and (iii) stating that reflexive derisking could destabilize or disrupt access to U.S. financing, hinder international trade, cross-border business, and charitable activities, and make claim remittances harder to effectuate.

It is difficult to distill clear and specific practical points from the recent GAO statement, entitled “Bank Secrecy Act – Further Actions Needed to Address Domestic and International Derisking Concerns” (“Derisking Statement”). This is partly because, during the course of listing various perceived concerns regarding the practice of derisking, the Derisking Statement merely comments somewhat vaguely that, “[w]ithout accessing the full range of BSA/AML factors that may be influencing banks to derisk or close branches, Treasury, the federal banking regulators, and Congress do not have the information needed to determine if BSA/AML regulations and their implementation can be made more effective or less burdensome.”

Bearing in mind the above limitations of the statement, the Derisking Statement summarizes itself as follows:

Why GAO Did This Study

In recent years, some Southwest border residents and businesses reported difficulty accessing banking services, including experiencing bank account terminations and bank branch closings in the region. In addition, the World Bank and others have reported that some money transmitters have been losing access to banking services with depository institutions.

This statement is based on findings from GAO’s February 2018 report on access to banking services along the Southwest border (GAO-18-263) and March 2018 report on the effects of derisking on remittance flows to fragile countries (GAO-18-313). GAO discusses (1) the extent to which banks are terminating accounts and closing branches in the Southwest border region, (2) the extent to which money transmitters serving selected fragile countries are facing banking access challenges, and (3) actions relevant U.S. agencies have taken to respond to these challenges. For those reports, GAO surveyed more than 400 banks, developed an econometric model on the drivers of branch closures, and conducted case studies on four countries to assess the effects of derisking on remittances flows.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made five recommendations in the two reports: to Treasury and the federal banking regulators to conduct a retrospective review of BSA/AML regulations and their implementation, and to Treasury to assess shifts in remittance flows to nonbanking channels. Banking regulators agreed with the recommendations. GAO requested comments from Treasury, but none were provided.

Ultimately, what is clear from the Derisking Statement is that the spectrum of financial services available to certain markets is shrinking due to concerns over AML/BSA enforcement, which the U.S. government somewhat perversely suggests are overblown.  What is not clear from the statement is whether U.S. regulators will tackle this issue, or how they should tackle this issue.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. To learn more about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team, please click here.

Bank’s Alleged “Tick Box” Approach Failed to Attain Substantive AML Compliance

Late last week, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), the United Kingdom’s financial services regulator, imposed a $1.2 million (896,100 pound) fine on the UK division of India’s Canara Bank, an Indian state-owned bank, and ordered a moratorium on new deposits for nearly five months.  The cause—according to Reuters—was Canara’s systemic anti-money laundering (“AML”) failures.

A 44-page final notice published by the FCA explains the multi-year regulatory process that led to a finding of systemic failures and the imposition of penalties.  The FCA’s investigation began in late 2012 and early 2013 with assessments of Canara’s AML systems.  Upon inspection, the FCA “notified Canara of a number of serious weaknesses in its AML systems and controls.”  After promises of remedial action by Canara, an April 2015 visit revealed that the AML systems had not been fixed.  The investigation ended with a final report from a “skilled person,” an expert brought in by the FCA to assess Canara’s AML policies and procedures, completed in January 2016.  Settlement followed, resulting in sanctions and the FCA’s published final notice.

These three visits from the FCA generated a laundry list of Canara’s AML shortcomings.  This enforcement action reflects three main take-aways: (i) the potential risks faced by banks operating in foreign countries in which they have limited AML experience; (ii) the need for swift remedial action after the first examination finding AML deficiencies; and (iii) the need for a substantive AML policy implemented in a substantive way, rather than through a rote reliance on AML-related checklists. Continue Reading Canara Bank of India Fined $1.2 Million by UK Regulators for Systemic AML Failures

OCC Identifies AML/BSA and Cyber Threats as Elevated Risks Facing Banks

Last week, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) published the Spring 2018 Semiannual Risk Perspective (the “Report”), which uses up-to-date data to identify risks to U.S. banks and measure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  The Report concluded that some of the OCC’s primary concerns are with banks’ abilities to comply with the anti‑money laundering (“AML”) laws and regulations, as well as to manage risks associated with cybersecurity threats.

Many of the OCC’s observations and recommendations remained the same from its Fall 2017 report, about which we previously blogged, begging readers to wonder what will spur less conversation and potentially more action among OCC-supervised banks or concrete guidance by the OCC.  Regardless, a common thread running throughout both reports is the potential risk presented to financial institutions by emerging technologies, which carry the simultaneous blessing and curse of business opportunities and compliance risks. Continue Reading OCC Report: Same Threats, Different Season

Commonwealth Bank of Australia (“CBA”), the largest bank in Australia, has agreed to a proposed civil settlement — subject to court approval — of historic proportions, involving a fine of approximately $700 million Australian dollars (roughly equivalent to $530 million U.S. dollars) regarding numerous alleged Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter Terrorism Financing (“CTF”) violations.  The settlement is with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (“AUSTRAC”) – a government financial intelligence agency whose counterpart in the U.S. would be the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) — and represents the largest such enforcement action in the history of Australia.  Under the settlement, AUSTRAC also will recoup its legal costs of $2.5 million Australian dollars.

As we have blogged, AUSTRAC filed on August 3, 2017 a claim seeking civil monetary penalties against CBA for over 53,000 alleged violations of Australia’s AML/CTF law.  Although the case involves several types of alleged AML violations, it fundamentally rests on the bank’s use of so-called intelligent deposit machines (“IDMs”), a type of ATM which allowed customers to anonymously deposit and transfer cash.  Unfortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly, the IDMs also became an alleged favored conduit for money laundering by criminals involved in drug trafficking and illegal firearms. Continue Reading Australia’s Largest Bank Agrees to Historic AML Penalty

On April 19, 2018, the European Parliament (“EP”) adopted the European Commission’s (the “Commission”) proposal for a Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“AMLD5”) to prevent terrorist financing and money laundering through the European Union’s (“EU”) financial system. The Commission proposed this directive on July 26, 2016 to build upon and amend the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“AMLD4”) – before all 28 member states even implemented AMLD4.

Under AMLD4, the EU sought to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by imposing registration and customer due diligence requirements on “obliged entities,” which it defined as banks and other financial and credit institutions. It also called for the creation of central registers comprised of information about who owns companies operating in the EU and directed that these registers be accessible to national authorities and obliged entities.  However, the European Central Bank warned that AMLD4 failed to effectively address recent trends in money laundering and terrorist financing, which have spanned multiple jurisdictions and fallen both within and outside of the traditional financial sector.  As a result, and in response to recent terrorist attacks in Europe and to the Panama Papers, the EP has adopted AMLD5 to more effectively keep pace with these recent trends.

Although AMLD5 contains several important provisions, including a proposed public registry of beneficial owners of legal entities, we focus here on how AMLD5 addresses, for the first time, the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by virtual currencies. Continue Reading The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Extending the Scope of the European Union’s Regulatory Authority to Virtual Currency Transactions