On Friday, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a civil forfeiture complaint in the Southern District of Texas seeking recovery of approximately $144 million in assets that allegedly represent the proceeds of foreign corruption and which were laundered in and through the U.S. The complaint’s narrative focuses on Diezani Alison-Madueke, who is Nigeria’s former Minister for Petroleum Resources.  The 52-page complaint, which contains additional attachments, is very detailed – but nonetheless interesting reading – so we will discuss here only three salient points:

  • The most eye-catching property subject to forfeiture, the spectacular yacht Galactica Star (which you can inspect here), apparently has no discernible nexus to the U.S. – except that the funds used to acquire the yacht allegedly were transferred through correspondent bank accounts at financial institutions which process their U.S. dollar wire transactions through the U.S.
  • The complaint emphasizes the continued enforcement focus on high-end U.S. real estate as a potential vehicle for money laundering from abroad.
  • The complaint purports to quote a recording of a conversation allegedly made by Ms. Alison-Madueke herself, in which she allegedly offers a co-schemer some critiques on his approach to laundering illicit funds.

Continue Reading Alleged Nigerian Oil Industry Corruption and Civil Forfeiture: More Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law; More High-End Real Estate; and Advice on Laundering

Two days after North Korea’s successful long-range ballistic missile test, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia unsealed a memorandum opinion which granted the Department of Justice “damming” warrants to seize all funds in bank accounts belonging to five Chinese companies which allegedly were used to hide transactions with North Korea using U.S. currency in violation of U.S. sanctions and money laundering laws. The underlying conduct allegedly resulted in over $700 million of prohibited transactions being processed by eight international banks. The opinion is noteworthy not only because it demonstrates the important relationship between money laundering laws and foreign policy, but also for the government’s use of anticipatory warrants to seize the assets upon arrival to the targeted accounts, and to prevent those assets from exiting.

Continue Reading Damming the Funding to North Korea: Anticipatory Seizure Warrants as a Tool to Enforce Sanctions and Thwart Money Laundering Transfers

Part Three of a Three-Part Series

In the third and final part of this series on marijuana-related businesses (“MRBs”), we explore how the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have commenced actions against MRBs and operators for allegedly fraudulent and deceptive securities practices.  The sample of such actions which we discuss here serve to demonstrate not only the risks the investing public may face in investing in MRBs, but also as a reminder to MRBs seeking to capitalize on the industry’s explosive growth of the exacting standards of the securities laws and the government’s commitment to enforcing them in this industry.

Although the cases we discuss here are not tied specifically to AML/BSA enforcement cases, but rather to traditional allegations of securities violations, the practical point is that anyone who is considering wading into this industry should remember that there are multiple federal agencies which may pursue their own enforcement agendas relating to MRBs. Although we previously have noted during this series that the Financial Criminal Enforcement Network issued guidelines giving banks the go-ahead to work with MRBs, and although the 2013 DOJ Cole Memo seems to suggest that financial institutions can serve MRBs under certain circumstances, our discussion here reflects that there still are other government agencies which may have their own notions regarding what is acceptable conduct by a MRB.  As to the SEC specifically, these actions also are consistent with the recent trend of the SEC inserting itself into AML-related enforcement. Continue Reading The Marijuana Industry and the Securities Laws

Part Two of a Three-Part Series

In the second part of this series, we explore the practical effects of the FinCEN and DOJ guidance documents on industries attempting to serve marijuana related business (“MRBs”). On June 27, 2017, the Tenth Circuit issued an interesting and divided opinion showing us how difficult it can be to square the prohibitions in the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) and money laundering statutes with state legislation legalizing certain MRB activity and the seemingly permissive nature of the FinCEN and DOJ guidance documents. Continue Reading Continued and Unexpected Roadblocks to Serving MRBs: Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank

Part One of a Three-Part Series

We begin this week with a three-part series on banking and the marijuana industry. States continue to pass medical and recreational use marijuana legislation despite that the fact that the substance remains classified as a Schedule I drug subject to the federal Controlled Substances Act.  Thus, the medical and recreational marijuana industries continue to struggle with access to banking and credit, and those who attempt to serve these industries find themselves subject to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and the criminal money laundering provisions.  As we will detail this week, the struggle for financial institutions attempting to service the marijuana industry comes not only from the BSA and AML provisions, but in other forms.  We start this week with an overview of the guidance documents issued by the federal government which identify the enforcement priorities and also potential windows for financial institutions to service the marijuana industry.  We will follow up with a discussion of a recent federal court decision illustrating the practical difficulties of squaring the prohibitions of the federal drug laws with permissive state laws and the federal guidance documents.  We will conclude with an exploration of how federal agencies beyond the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), can further muddy these waters by staking out their own regulatory and enforcement priorities.  –Priya Roy Continue Reading Banking and the Marijuana Industry

On June 29, dual trial verdicts in the Southern District of New York paved the way for the government to seize 650 Fifth Avenue, a 36-story building in Manhattan valued at up to $1 billion (“the Property”). The defendants, representing New York entities that trace their roots to Iran, were convicted of violating U.S. sanctions and money laundering. With this decision, the government can lay claim to the largest terrorism-related civil forfeiture in U.S. history and, as promised, provide the sale’s proceeds to terror victims who had previously won $5 billion in judgments against Iran for terror-related activity.

Continue Reading Lessons in Civil Forfeiture and Attachment: U.S. May Seize 650 Fifth Avenue

A Guest Blog by Bruce Zagaris, Esq.

Today we are very pleased to welcome guest blogger Bruce Zagaris, who is a Partner at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe.  He is the editor of the International Enforcement Law Reporter; the author of International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials; and an Adjunct Professor at the Texas A & M University School of  Law.  Mr. Zagaris also is a member of the Task Force on the Gatekeeper and the Profession of the American Bar Association (“ABA”).

As Mr. Zagaris explains immediately below, growing international trends have led the ABA Task Force to consider a new Model Rule of Professional Conduct that would impose basic “client due diligence” requirements on U.S. lawyers to determine whether their clients are engaging in money laundering or terrorist financing.  This development relates directly to issues about which we previously have blogged, including European perceptions of lawyers as potential gatekeepers and of the United States as a haven for money laundering and tax evasion.  The possible new Model Rule potentially would represent a significant shift in how the U.S. legal profession regards itself and its relationship to its clients.  We hope that you enjoy this discussion by Mr. Zagaris of these important issues. -Peter Hardy

Increasingly, international bodies are calling for higher standards for gatekeepers, known in the parlance of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) as “designated non-financial businesses and professions” (“DNFBPs”). DNFBPs include lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, and trust and company service providers (other than trust companies).  In particular, in the United States, lawyers play a key role in areas that give rise to potential money laundering:  company formation; real estate transactions; business planning; tax planning; wealth management; trust and estate work; and formation and operation of charities, including transnational philanthropy.

In 2006 and again in 2016, the FATF, an intergovernmental body in charge of making and overseeing compliance with international money laundering standards, performed Mutual Evaluation Reports (“MERs”) to assess compliance by the United States with international standards.  While the FATF gave the U.S. high marks generally, both MERs found the U.S. “non-compliant” in gatekeepers and entity transparency.

As a result of this international trend, the ABA’s Task Force on the Gatekeeper and the Profession has prepared and discussed a new ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct that would impose basic “client due diligence” requirement on lawyers.  We discuss this potential new model rule, and the developments which have led to its consideration, below.  Clearly, due diligence for lawyers will increasingly be on the radars of banks, financial institutions, and law firms. Continue Reading AML Due Diligence Standards for U.S. Lawyers

Financial institutions face an increasing risk that alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) requirements will lead to follow-on allegations of securities law violations. We have blogged about investor class action suits against financial institutions based on alleged violations of BSA/AML rules.  We also have blogged about recent enforcement actions by the SEC alleging violations of the securities laws due to underlying violations of the BSA by broker dealers.  This post briefly notes the latest chapter in what seems to be a growing book regarding the convergence of AML/BSA and securities law.

In a complaint, later amended, filed in the Middle District of Tennessee against BancorpSouth Inc., investor plaintiffs alleged that the bank and its CEO, CFO and COO made misleading statements and omissions in SEC filings regarding (1) the bank’s compliance with BSA/AML regulations and the bank’s fair lending practices, and (2) the closing of two pending mergers/acquisitions. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew at the relevant time that the bank was not in compliance with the AML/BSA regulations, due to a pending “target review” by the FDIC – which later resulted in a consent order between the FDIC and the bank regarding its AML obligations – but nonetheless stated that (1) the bank was in compliance with all banking laws and regulations; (2) they expected the two planned mergers to close in the second quarter of 2014; and (3) they expected to receive regulatory approval for those mergers. The plaintiffs allege that defendants thereby violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by making statements which misrepresented or omitted material facts.  According to the plaintiffs, when the AML/BSA problems eventually came to light, these problems allegedly delayed the anticipated mergers, and the bank’s stock value fell significantly, which thereby harmed investors.

As noted, the plaintiffs sued not only the bank itself, but also members of senior management. This approach is consistent with the recent focus on individual liability in AML/BSA matters.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the individual executive defendants:

. . . . were ultimately responsible for ensuring that the Bank maintained an effective BSA/AML compliance program and that the Company’s program complied with the “4 Pillars” of BSA/AML compliance. In fact, federal regulations specifically require that the Company’s BSA/AML compliance program must be in writing, approved by the Board of Directors . . . , and noted in the board minutes.  Defendants were also responsible for creating a “culture of compliance” to ensure Company-wide adherence to the Bank’s BSA/AML policies, procedures and processes, but failed to do so, instead prioritizing . . . cost-cutting measures.

On Monday, the district court granted, for the second time (after having been initially reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), class certification to the plaintiffs against the bank.  The class certification decision involved a review the requirements imposed by Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and  will not be analyzed here. The point for the purposes of this blog is that it has become clear that, in regards to AML/BSA compliance, publically-traded financial institutions are compelled to wage a multi-front war.  Regardless of the actual merits of the complaint against BanccorpSouth, its mere existence reflects that financial institutions must concern themselves not only with FinCEN, the Department of Justice, and the relevant examiner, but also with putative investor plaintiffs and the SEC – thereby increasing the stakes regarding decisions over the disclosure in SEC filings of possible violations of AML/BSA requirements.

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The District Court for the Eastern District of New York has denied motions for acquittal and new trial by a Florida attorney convicted at trial of assisting in an undercover money laundering “sting” operation.

Although the sting operation was orchestrated by an undercover FBI agent, it was modeled on a similar, uncharged and actual scheme to launder the proceeds of fake stock certificates in which the attorney allegedly had participated previously, and which had been run by the defendant’s former client – who introduced the attorney to the undercover FBI agent.  As is typical for money laundering prosecutions of third-party professionals, the key issue was knowledge. Continue Reading “Sting” Money Laundering Scheme and Cooperating Client Ensnares Attorney